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I. Response to Larry's Statement of Facts. 
On October 3, 2006, the Appellant/Cross-Respondent Claudia Johnson ("Claudia") 
returned with the parties' two minor children to Buffalo, New York, where the family had lived 
for approximately eleven years. (R., Vol. I, p. 21, 13.) Claudia and the children had been in 
Idaho for less than three months. (Id.) Claudia did not conceal the children's location. Claudia 
did not deny the Respondent/Cross-Appellant Larry Johnson ("Larry") visitation or 
communication with the children. Claudia did not take the children to a state where the parties 
had never lived. As strenuously as Larry tries to characterize Claudia as a kidnapper, the truth of 
the matter is that she simply returned home. 
Larry's allegations that Claudia restricted his access to the children are simply not true. 
Larry had many opportunities for visitation even prior to the entry of the stipulated New York 
custody order. (R., Vol. I, p.157.) For example, a hearing was scheduled in New York on 
December 21, 2006, for the express purpose to discuss visitation for Christmas. (Affidavit of 
Claudia Johnson in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Orders filed July 10, 2008, 
7 10.)' Larry chose not to appear even though he had retained counsel in New York who entered 
a limited appearance on December 1, 2006 on the issues of custody and support. (R., Vol. I, 
p.106; Claudia Aff., 710.) Lany had visitation for a week during Presidents Day 2007 in Idaho 
and he changed his mind at the last minute and decided not to exercise it; he planned to attend a 
CASE Conference instead. (Claudia Aff., 71 1.) Larry was entitled to court-ordered visitation 
' The Affidavit of Claudia Johnson in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Orders filed July 10,2008 
(hereinafter referred to as "Claudia Aff.") is included in the record by this Court's Order Granting Motion to 
Augment the Record entered on September 26,2008. 
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with the children in Idaho from April 6 through April 15,2007. (Claudia Aff., 713.) However, 
Larry chose to terminate the children's health insurance in violation of the Automatic Order just 
prior to their travel date and therefore the New York court entered an order staying the visitation 
so that the children would not be travelling without health insurance. (Claudia Aff., 713, Ex. A.) 
Larry's allegation that he was denied communication with the children is also incorrect. 
The children called and spoke with Larry at least four times between the time Claudia and the 
children returned home to Buffalo and Christmas 2006. (Claudia Aff., 722.) During that time 
period the children called Larry twelve times and left messages and Larry did not return the calls. 
(Id.) Larry only called the children one time during that time frame and left a message on 
November 19,2006. On November 20,2006, Larry terminated Claudia's cell phone service and 
ended the children's ability to communicate with him. (Id.) After he terminated the cell phone 
service, Larry sent two phone cards to the children. (Claudia Aff., 723.) Claudia also purchased 
two phone cards for the children to call Larry and took them to places where they could call him. 
(Id.) Pursuant to the stipulated New York custody order, Larry was ordered to provide a cell 
phone for the children. (R., Vol. I, p.162.) The cell phone amved at Claudia's attorney's office 
on December 19,2007, and she picked it up on December 20,2007, and promptly gave it to the 
children. (Claudia Aff., 728.) Larry has not been denied communication with the children. 
On November 12,2007, Claudia and her attorney met with Larry and his attorney, Roger 
Davison, at the law offices of Offerman, Cassano, Greco, Slisz and Adarns, LLP to negotiate 
divorce and custody settlement. (Claudia Aff., 715.) The following day, on November 13,2007, 
the parties stipulated to the entry of the custody order in New York on the record before the court 
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with their attorneys present. (R., Vol. I, pp. 157-1 72.) Larry had visitation with the children that 
same night. (Claudia Aff., 716.) Claudia has always complied with the New York custody 
order. 
Larry cannot and does not dispute the fact that his attorney Keith Kadish entered a 
limited appearance in the state of New York for the purposes of custody and support on 
December 1, 2006. Larry does not dispute that Mr. Kadish had authority to enter the limited 
appearance. Larry does not dispute that Mr. Kadish entered a general appearance on April 20, 
2007. Larry does not dispute that he appeared in New York for tlie two-day divorce trial and 
was represented by attorney Roger Davidson. Larry does not dispute the fact that he stipulated 
to the custody arrangement before the New York court on November 13,2007. 
Now Larry argues that all of the foregoing conduct was involuntary and the New York 
court "coerced" him into entering into the stipulation. The New York court did not force Larry 
to enter into a stipulation and did not force Larry to appear in New York. Larry was represented 
by two attorneys in New York and one attorney in Idaho. When jurisdictional issues arise, such 
as in this case, parties are often faced with this very dilemma - "Do I appear and subject myself 
to the jurisdiction of the court or do I not appear and contest jurisdiction?" The New York court 
was absolutely correct when it stated, "Well, you can't have it both ways." (R., Vol. I, p. 121.) 
Larry attempts to characterize the New York court's statement as a threat, but this 
characterization is simply not supported by the record.' It is clear from the record that Larry 
It is not lost on counsel that Larry has improperly included punctuation, an exclamation point no less, at the end of 
the court's statement, "Well, you can't have it both ways," where no exclamation point is included in the transcript. 
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wanted to proceed with the litigation in New York. The exchange at court on November 13, 
2006, was as follows: 
MR. DAVISON: All right. Your honor, just for the ---just for the 
record, my client wants me to just place on the record that he's 
here in New York under protest and his --- he objects to the 
general appearance that was entered by his former counsel, Keith 
Kadish. He said that an appearance was made by Keith, he never 
authorized it, so he wanted me to place that on the record and I am 
placing that on the record. 
MR. MESSINA: With all due respect, then he should retire to 
Idaho and we can proceed by default. 
MR. DAVISON: I'm putting it on the record and we're ready to 
proceed. 
MR. MESSINA: He's here under his own free will or he's not. If 
he's under coercion, I don't want to be a party to that, your Honor. 
He should leave immediately. 
MR. DAVISON: I'm telling you - 
THE COURT: Let me ask a dumb question. Who authorized Mr. 
Kadish to appear? 
MR. DAVISON: He tells me, and I'd have to go back and look at 
my notes, but he said that it was a - there was apparently a special 
notice of appearance made early on by Mr. Kadish. 
THE COURT: Well --- 
MR. DAVISON: And ultimately it turned into a general 
appearance on the part of him, and he said well, that was never 
authorized. But basically he's putting that on the record just to let 
it [sic] know that Keith did something that he didn't want him to 
do. But he's here because he wants to get the rest of these issues 
litigated. 
It appears that Lany is attempting to contort the court's comment to support his coercion argument, hut that 
argument is not supported by the record. (RespondentICross-Appellant's Brief, p. 28.) 
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THE COURT: Well, then what's the point of - if there's no 
appearance, if Mr. Kadish wasn't authorized to appear and 
participate in these proceedings, all of these proceedings, including 
the telephone conference with the magistrate in Idaho - 
MR. DAVISON: He was authorized for that. 
THE COURT: --then I think Mr. Messina's absolutely correct, 
isn't he? 
MR. DAVISON: We want to move ahead with this, but we wanted 
to ~ u t  on the record- 
THE COURT: Well, you can't have it both ways. 
MR. DAVISON: Yeah. He 's here, were readv to ~roceed. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and call your first witness. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 121-123 (emphasis added).) On November 13, 2007, the parties entered into a 
stipulation on the record to the custody order that is currently in place.3 (R. Vol. I, pp. 157-172.) 
The pertinent portions of the stipulation are as follows: 
MS. MC FADDEN-ZAK~: . . . The parties have agreed that New 
York State will retain jurisdiction over this matter, and that any of 
the terms of this agreement can be modified by the mutual written 
agreement of the parties in the future. That's it. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Johnson, you've been here, you heard the 
same things that the attorneys had to say. 
MR. JOHNSON: I have. 
The Judgment of Divorce After Trial was ultimately entered on March 18,2008. (R. Vol. I, pp. 126-132.) 
Cheryl McFadden-Zak was the law guardian for the children. (R., Vol. I, p. 160.) 
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THE COURT: Is that your agreement that's been placed on the 
record? 
MR. JOHNSON: It is. 
THE COURT: And do you believe that under all the 
circumstances of this case, that that agreement is in the best 
interests of your children? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that agreement will be 
incorporated into the judgment and it will survive as a separate and 
binding contract? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you've signed the same document indicating 
your understanding of that, is that right? 
MR. JOHNSON: I have. 
(R., VoI. I, p. 165, L. 12-16, p. 171, L. 6-25.) Lany volllntarily stipulated to the New York 
custody order and Larry has court-ordered visitation with the children. 
11. Standard of Review 
Under this Court's recent decision in Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 783 P.3d 758 
(2008), Judge Drescher's decision is reviewed directly. With respect to Judge Orr's decision, 
this Court must review her findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Losser, 183 P.3d at 760, citing Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,561,633 
P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981). Judge Orr's decisions were supported by substantial and competent 
evidence and Judge Drescher committed error when he reversed the orders. 
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111. The District Court Committed Error When it Reversed the Magistrate's 
Decision and Relied on Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761 
(2007). 
A. Lany Did Not Raise the Issue of Child Custody Jurisdiction in his Appeal 
to the District Court. 
Larry did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") on his appeal to the district court. This 
Court held in Fairway Development Co. v. Peterson, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 
866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993), where the appellant listed an issue on appeal, but failed to present 
argument on that issue in its briefing and did not present the issue to the a district court it would 
not be addressed. Moreover, this Court stated, "nor will we consider issues on appeal which are 
unsupported by argument or authority." Fairway Development, Co., 124 Idaho at 870,865 P.2d 
at 961, citing Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224,796 P.2d 101 (1990). "This Court has 
held that it will not consider an issue if it was not raised as an issue on appeal. The Court has 
relaxed this requirement where the issue was either addressed by authorities cited or arguments 
contained in the briefs." State v. Radebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993), 
citing State v. Preshvitch, 116 Idaho 959,961,783 P.2d 298,300 (1989). 
Larry asserts that he did raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to the district court 
and points to his Notice of Appeal that provides, "The trial court originally rewarded Defendant 
who absconded with the children to New York, then deferred on the issue of custody, only to 
eventually send all issues to New York, which deference was not supported by law or fact." (R. 
Vol. I, p.7, v.) This statement does not identify the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over 
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custody, but nonetheless, even if his Notice of Appeal had properly identified the issue, as this 
Court explained in Fairway Development, the appellant must still present argument on that issue 
even if the issue is raised in the notice. 
On appeal to the district court, Larry alleged in both Appellant's Brief and in Appellant's 
Reply Brief that New York did not have personal jurisdiction over Larry, he did not address or 
dispute subject matter jurisdiction regarding child custody. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 83-120.) Larry 
set forth two arguments on appeal: (1) that the magistrate court improperly deferred to New 
York because New York did not have personal jurisdiction over Larry and (2) that the magistrate 
court erred by dismissing the action because Idaho was the only court with subject matter 
jurisdiction over the issues of property and debt, divorce, child support and spousal 
maintenance. There is no discussion whatsoever regarding subject matter jurisdiction over 
custody issues. Therefore the district court committed error when it reversed the November 29, 
2006 Order when the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over child custody was never raised or 
argued by Larry. 
B. The Hopper Decision Does Not Address Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Under the UCCJEA. 
The district court committed error when it reversed the November 29,2006 Order on the 
basis that the magistrate made "erroneous decisions in refusing to exercise jurisdiction." (R. 
Vol. I, p. 135.) The magistrate court could not exercise jurisdiction because it did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over custody. 
APPELLANTICROSSRESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 8- 
The district court failed to address subject matter jurisdiction, let alone, articulate how the 
magistrate's decision was erroneous and how Idaho did have subject matter jurisdiction under 
the UCCEA. The district court never issued a fmding that Idaho does have subject matter 
jurisdiction over custody. 
Larry repeatedly argues that remedial action should have been taken immediately in 
Idaho and apparently believes that Hopper provides the expansive authority to permit an Idaho 
court to issue a custody order even when it is without subject matter jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA.~ Hopper does not address subject matter jurisdiction or the UCCJEA. The only 
reference in Hopper to jurisdiction is when this Court states, "The Montana actions were 
consolidated and eventually dismissed on August 14, 2003 in deference to Idaho's jurisdiction 
over the matter." Hopper, 167 P.3d at 762 (emphasis added). Presumably, the Montana and 
Idaho courts conferred and concluded that Idaho was the "home state" because the parties had 
lived in Idaho for more than 6 months before the mother left for Montana. 
The facts in this case could not be M h e r  from the facts in Hopper. In this case, the 
parties lived in New York for approximately eleven years. Claudia and the children lived in 
Idaho for less than three months. Claudia did not conceal or hide the children. Claudia did not 
relocate to another state where the parties had never resided. Claudia did not file any false 
Judge Schiller recognized that Hopper does not address jurisdictional issues and stated, "m doesn't say one 
word about jurisdiction ..." (Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 13, L. 14.) "And in this case, Judge Drescher, is now taking m a step W e r  and applying &pgg to a jurisdictional question. Lkggg didn't have anything to do with 
jurisdiction. h&gg had to do with a custody decision. There was only one court exercising jurisdiction at that 
point in time. And - and I don't think that goes that far. I don't think m overrules the statutes on what 
is property custody - or proper jurisdiction. I personally think that Judge Om made the proper decision." (Ti., Supp. 
Vol. 11, p.37, L. 25, p. 38, L. 1-9.) 
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domestic violence reports, although she has submitted evidence to the district court of physical 
and mental abuse. (R. Vol. I, p. 174,75.) Claudia simply returned home. 
Additionally, the district court erred when it concluded that Claudia had engaged in 
criminal acts in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-4506. Claudia has never been charged with a crime 
under Section 18-4506; Claudia has never plead guilty to a crime under Section 18-4506; and 
Claudia has never been found guilty of a crime under Section 18-4506. Moreover, while the 
district court did not have the benefit of this Court's decision in Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 
859, 187 P.3d 1234 (2008), this Court explained that Hopper is distinguishabIe where the facts 
establish that the party leaving the state may have a valid defense under Idaho Code 8 18- 
4506(2)(a)-(b). Claudia presented evidence in support of her motion to reconsider to establish 
that she had a viable defense. (R., Vol. I, p. 174,IS.) 
IV. New York has Both Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
A. New York has Personal Jurisdiction Over Larry. 
First, the New York court has personal jurisdiction over Larry under its long arm statute. 
On February 7,2007, the New York court entered an order and made the specific finding that it 
has jurisdiction over Larry pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules 5 302(b), also known as 
New York's long arm statute. (R., Vol. I, p. 63.) That statute provides: 
Personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in matrimonial 
actions or family court proceedings. A court in any matrimonial 
action or family court proceeding involving a demand for support, 
alimony, maintenance, distributive awards or special relief in 
matrimonial actions may exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no 
longer is a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her 
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executor or administrator, if the party seeking support is a resident 
of or domiciled in this state at the time such demand is made, 
provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile ofthe parties 
before their separation, or the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in 
this state, or the claim for support, alimony, maintenance, 
distributive awards or special relief in matrimonial actions accrued 
under the laws of this state or under an agreement executed in this 
state. 
CPLR § 302(b)(emphasis added.) The "before their separation" language has been addressed in 
numerous New York court opinions and is interpreted broadly. "The term 'before their 
separation' means that the separation of the parties must have taken place in this state 'at least 
within the recent past' or that New York must have been the place of the 'last substantial marital 
domicile before separation."' Staron v. Staron, 215 A.D.2d 646,646-47,629 N.Y.S.2d 46,46-47 
(1995), citing Lieb v. Lieb, 53 A.D.2d 67,72,385 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1976). 
The court in Paparella v. Paparella, 74 A.D.2d 106, 107, 426 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1980), 
found personal jurisdiction based on the "strong interest [New York] has in the outcome because 
of the long period during which New York had been the parties' marital domicile, their relatively 
recent departure from the State and the short time plaintiff lived without it." In Paparella, the 
court found personal jurisdiction over the defendant despite his absence from the state for a little 
more than two years, during which he lived in Florida (except for a short time when the parties 
lived together in New Jersey). The concurring opinion is important. In addressing the 
constitutional due process issues, Judge Moule, concurring, stated: 
Here, no attempt is made "to ensnare one in whom the state has not 
had a legitimate and proper concern" (Browne v. Browne, 53 
A.D.2d 134, 137,385 N.Y.S.2d 983,985). The parties made their 
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marital home here for over 26 years. All of their children were 
born and raised in New York State. Defendant practiced medicine 
in Batavia, New York for 21 years. Plaintiff has, after a brief 
absence, returned to this state seeking to avail herself of the rights 
which have accrued under a relationship which has had by far 
stronger ties with New York than with any other forum. Under 
similar circumstances, in Browne v. Browne (supra), this court 
stated in an opinion by Dillon, J.: 
The state's abiding interest in those of the family 
unit who remain as domiciliaries should not be cut 
off because a marital partner, for whatever reason, 
prefers another climate. 
To the contrary, to pennit the defendant to circumvent obligations 
which had accrued during his long association with this state 
would be repugnant to a rational concept of justice. 
Paparella, supra at 1 12. 
New York was the last place of substantial marital domicile before the parties separated. 
The parties had resided in New York with their children for eleven years prior to Lany moving 
to Idaho in January of 2006. Claudia was only in Idaho with the children for less than three 
months before she returned to New York. It does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice for Larry to be required to defendant an action in New York on marital issues, 
the state of marital domicile of the parties immediately preceding Larry's relocation to Idaho. 
Second, Larry voluntarily appeared in New York and submitted to personal jurisdiction. 
Larry argues that his attorney Keith Kadish entered the general appearance without his authority 
and consent and that Larry never intended to subject himself to the personal jurisdiction of New 
York and that the New York court "forced" and coerced" Larry into participating in Iitigation 
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(RespondentICross-Appellant's Brief, p. 25.) This argument fails under Idaho and New York 
law.6 This Court recently held that a party's intent is not the controIling factor in determining 
whether a voluntary appearance has been made, but rather the controlling factor is whether by 
their conduct they have voluntarily submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the court. In Rhino 
Metals, Inc. v. Howard Crafi, - P.3d -, 2008 WL 433743 (Idaho), this Court stated, "Under 
Rule 4(i), whether or not a defendant has made a general or a special appearance is based upon 
the defendant's conduct, not upon the defendant's intent. Unless the defendant has complied 
with the Rule's requirements for making a special appearance, the defendant has made a general 
appearance. Whether or not Craft intended to make a general appearance is irrelevant." Rhino 
Metals. 2008 W L  4330743 at *3. 
"The defendant appears in an action when he answers, demurs, or gives the plaintiff 
written notice of his appearance, or when an attorney gives notice of appearance for him." 
Pittenger v. A.L. G. Barnes Circus, 39 Idaho 807, 230 P. 1011 (1924)(emphasis added). A 
general appearance is the equivalent of a "voluntary" appearance. See Lohman v. Flynn, 139 
Idaho 312,318,78 P.3d 379,385 (2003). 
Larry argues that his attorney cannot bind him to personal jurisdiction; this is in 
contravention of well-established law in Idaho. "Idaho appellate courts have long held that civil 
litigants choose their attorneys and cannot avoid the consequences of their attorney's actions." 
Dep't of Health and Pe'elfare v. Conley, 132 Idaho 266, 271, 971 P.2d 332, 337 (1999), citing 
Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass'n, 107 Idaho 1,2,684 P.2d 978,979 (1984). 
Claudia cited to authority from New York in Appellant's Brief at page 28. See Roseman v. McAvoy, 92 Misc.2d 
1063, 1064,401 N.Y.S.2d 988,989 (1978). 
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Larry's reliance on Muncey v. Children S Home Finding and Aid Sociew of Lewiston, 84 Idaho 
147, 369 P.2d 586 (1962) is misplaced because that case dealt with an attorneys ability to bind a 
client by a stipulation. As set forth above, an attorney that enters a written appearance submits 
his client to the jurisdiction of the court. 
Lastly, Larry's argument that he has been consistently "coerced" and "forced" to appear 
and litigate in New York simply is not plausible. As previously addressed, the fact that Larry 
had to choose whether to appear in New York and litigate the issues or not appear and contest the 
jurisdiction does not amount to coercion or duress; it is a dilemma that many are faced with in 
litigation when jurisdiction is at issue. The New York court was correct when it said, "Well, you 
can't have it both ways." (R., Vol. I, p. 123.) Larry has been represented during the entire 
course of litigation by counsel in Idaho and New York. Larry's appearance in New York was 
voluntary. 
B. New York Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
Larry's argument that New York does not have subject matter jurisdiction over divorce, 
property, debt or spousal maintenance is without merit. First, Larry's remedy lies with the New 
York appellate courts if he believes that the court in New York lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 
not with this Court. 
Second, the New York court does have subject matter jurisdiction under McKinney's 
DRL 3 230 which provides: 
An action to annul a marriage, or to declare the nullity of a void 
marriage, or for divorce or separation may be maintained only 
when: 
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1. The parties were married in the state and either party is a 
resident thereof when the action is commenced and has been a 
resident for a continuous period of one year immediately 
preceding, or 
2. The parties have resided in this state as husband and wife 
and either party is a resident thereof when the action is commenced 
and has been a resident for a continuous period of one year 
immediately preceding, or 
3. The cause occurred in the state and either party has been a 
resident thereof for a continuous period of at least one year 
immediately preceding the commencement of the action, or 
4. The cause occurred in the state an both parties are residents 
thereof at the time of the commencement of the action, or 
5. Either party has been a resident of the state for a continuous 
period of at least two years immediately preceding the 
commencement of the action. 
McKi~ey ' s  Domestic Relations Law $ 230. Lany argues that Claudia did not meet the 
residency requirement because she had only been in New York for one day before commencing 
the divorce action. Larry's application of the "residency" requirement under Section 230 is 
contrary to New York law. 
The New York courts have explained that each of the five standards set out in DRL $230 
contain a requirement that either or both of the parties is, or has been for a proscribed period, a 
"resident" of New York state. See McKinney's Domestic Relations Law $ 230, Historical and 
Statutoly Notes. On that basis, the New York courts have held that the choice as to whether 
"residence" means domicile or residence, is not mutually exclusive and therefore "residence" for 
DRL $ 230 purposes may mean either residence or domicile. See Wittich v. Wittich, 210 A.D.2d 
138 (1'' Dept. 1994); Unanue v. Unanue, 141 A.D.2d 31, 532 N.Y.S.2d 769 (2nd Dept. 1988). 
The residence test focuses on whether the party at issue has a significant connection to New 
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York as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year. Even if the 
party does not presently have a New York residence sufficient to meet the residency test, the 
party can satisfy DRL 9 230 based on domicile. Bourbon v. Bourbon, 259 A.D.2d 720, 687 
N.Y.S.2d 426 (2nd Dept. 1999). 
The parties and their children lived in New York for eleven years prior to Claudia and the 
children briefly residing in Idaho. Claudia has sufficient contacts to meet the domiciliary 
requirement under DRL Section 230. When Claudia arrived in New York after briefly being in 
Idaho she intended to make New York her home and has in fact made it her home. 
V. Idaho Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Custody Under the 
UCCJEA. 
A. New York is the "Home State" Under the UCCJEA. 
Larry does not dispute that Idaho is not the "home state" under Idaho Code 5 32-1 1-201 
(Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, p. 30.) Claudia and the children did not live in Idaho long 
enough to meet the 6 month minimum requirement. 
Larry argues that New York is also not the "home state" because the children had not 
lived in New York for six months "immediately before" the commencement of the proceedings. 
This argument must fail. The legal authority cited by Claudia provides that the courts look back 
six months before the commencement of the proceedings to determine whether there was a 
"home state" that existed during that time frame. In this case, that state was New York. If the 
Court were to follow Larry's interpretation, the UCCJEA "home state" analysis would never 
apply unless the proceedings were commenced the very next day after the parties arrived in this. 
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State; clearly that is not the intent of the UCCJEA because the UCCJEA favors the "home state" 
analysis. 
As recently as March of 2008, both of the cases cited by Claudia, Stephens and Welch- 
Dode, have been cited favorably by at least one other jurisdiction. In Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 
Ohio St.2d 241, 883 N.E.2d 420 (2008), the mother had moved with the parties children from 
West Virginia to the State of Ohio. The mother resided with the children in Ohio for 
approximately four months. The court held that West Virginia was the "home state" under the 
UCCJEA because it is where the children had resided for a period of more than six months 
within the six months of moving to Ohio. The Rosen court cited to both Stephens and to Welch- 
Doden, in addition to a number of other cases that have also interpreted the UCCJEA "home 
state" provision. See Lebejko v. LebejRo, 2007 WL 824452; Thomas v. Arkansas Depf. of 
Human Sers., WL 768729 (Ark.App.2005); In re Adoption of Asent, 90 Ohio St.3d 91, 734 
N.E.2d 1224 (2000). The Rosen court explained, "This interpretation of the pertinent UCCJEA 
provisions advances the primary purpose of the act to avoid jurisdictional competition and avoids 
rendered meaningless the provision conferring home state jurisdiction of the state that was the 
home state within six months before the commencement of the child-custody proceeding." 
Rosen, 883 N.E.2d at 429. 
The cases above explain that the "immediately preceding" language simply requires that 
there had to have been a "home state" within the six month period preceding the custody 
proceedings. "This interpretation promotes the priority of home state jurisdiction that the 
drafters of the UCCJEA specifically intended." Stephens, 128 P.3d at 1029. The Stephens court 
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explained that the interpretation posed by the father, which is the same argument that Lany is 
making, would result in narrowing the home state jurisdiction. "It would increase the number of 
potentially conflicting jurisdictional disputes in competing jurisdictions. This result conflicts 
with the UCCJEA's purpose." Id. The UCCJEA was amended to prevent courts from having to 
conduct a significant contacts analysis. 
Larry relies upon In re Brown, 203 S.W.3d 888 (2006), however that case is simply not 
applicable to this case. In Brown, the child was only eleven months old and had never lived in a 
state for six consecutive months; rather the child spent approximately 18 days per month in each 
state. 
Larry also relies upon, In re Marriage of Hamilton, 120 Wash.App. 147, 84 P.3d 259 
(2004). This case also does not support Larry's interpretation of the "home state" jurisdiction 
provision of the UCCJEA. In fact, it supports Claudia's position. In Hamilton, the Washington 
Court of Appeals held that neither Washington nor Texas were the "home state" under the 
UCCJEA and therefore employed a significant contacts analysis. In Hamilton, the parties and 
their minor child had lived in Texas for approximately four years. While father was teaching in 
another town, the mother left with the child and moved to the state of Washington on November 
14, 2001. The parties made some effort to resolve their differences in the Winter of 2001 and 
2002. Father visited Washington on two occasions. Wife filed a petition for dissolution in 
Washington on April 16, 2002. The father then later filed an action in Texas on June 10,2002. 
The court held that there was no "home state" because the mother and child had only resided in 
Washington for five months before the mother had commenced the action in Washington and 
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therefore Washington was not the "home state." Texas was also not the home state because 
father's action was not filed until June of 2002, and therefore child had not lived in Texas for the 
six months proceeding. The court stated, "Casey had not lived in Texas for six consecutive 
months before George commenced the action in Texas in June 2002. Nor was Texas his home 
state at any time those six months." Hamilton, 84 P.3d at 263 (emphasis added). Clearly, 
the Hamilton court also considered whether a home state had been established within the six 
months preceding the action. 
In this case, within the six months preceding the move to Idaho, the children and their 
mother had lived in New York for approximately eleven years. Therefore, a "home state" 
existed within the six months preceding the filing of the action in this case. It is clear that New 
York is the "home state" and is the only state with subject maner jurisdiction to make custody 
determinations. 
B. New York has More Significant Contacts. 
New York has more significant contacts than Idaho. Contrary to Larry's argument, 
nowhere in Hopper does this Court conduct a significant contacts analysis under the UCCJEA. 
Additionally, the significant contacts set forth by Claudia did not only arise after returning to 
Buffalo, New York. Larry argues that the courts should not consider any evidence of significant 
contacts after the children returned to New York, however the Hamilton case that he relied upon 
holds the exact opposite. In Hamilton, the father had argued that because mother absconded to 
Washington that the court should not consider any of the significant contacts, however the court 
rejected that argument. 
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In Hamilton, the father cited to In re Marriage of Ieronimakis, 66 Wash.App. 83, 92 83 1 
P.2d 172 (1992), in support of the proposition that the court will not consider a child's post- 
removal contacts with a state. Larry also relies upon Ieronimakis. 
Ieronimakis is not applicable. In that case, the mother, an American citizen, left her 
home in Greece with her two children one day when father was at work. She flew with the 
children to Washington and filed for divorce within one week. The father commenced 
proceedings in Greece. The Greek court awarded custody to the father. The Washington court 
awarded mother custody. The Ieronimakis court stated that, "to allow Washington courts to 
assert jurisdiction because [the mother] generated significant contacts with the state is in effect 
telling any abducting parent that if you can stay away from the home state long enough to 
generate new considerations and new evidence that is a sufficient reason for a new state to assert 
a right o adjudicate the issue." In re Hamilton, 84 P.3d at 264. 
The Hamilton court held that Ieronimakis was distinguishable from the facts in Hamilton 
and not applicable because Ieronimakis was decided under the prior UCCJA and not the 
UCCJEA. The Hamilton court explained, "The language of the UCCJEA is consistent with that 
of the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. 5 1738A, which prioritizes 'home state' jurisdiction by requiring that 
full faith and credit cannot be given to a child custody determination by a State that exercises 
initial jurisdiction as a 'significant connection state' when there is a home state." Hamilton, 84 
P.3d at 264. The UCCJA, which was in place at the time of Ieronimakis was decided, allowed 
the court to look at "significant connection" with Washington even if another state was the home 
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state of the child, as the court in Ieronimakis determined Greece was. Under the UCCJEA, the 
court is required to first determine if there is a "home state." 
Ieronimakis is not applicable to this case for the same reasons it was not applicable in 
Hamilton and because it was decided under the UCCJEA. The UCCJEA now requires that a 
court must determine first if there is5a "home state." Additionally, this case is distinguishable 
from Ieronimakis because in that case the children had never lived in the United States 
previously and were born in Greece. In this case, the children had lived in New York for most of 
their lives before just briefly being in Idaho. The children only lived in Idaho for two and one 
half months. The magistrate court considered the affidavits of both parties determined that the 
parties and the children's (not just Larry's) most significant contacts were in New York. 
Larry also appears to argue that the magistrate court's findings were not supported by law 
or fact because it "ignored" his argument "because the court had previously made up its mind ..." 
(RespondentICross-Appellant's Brief, p. 35.) This statement is completely baseless. This Court 
should disregard the nearly two page quotation in Larry's brief wherein he cites to the audio 
recording from the November 17, 2006 hearing because it is not properly part of this record on 
appeal and is submitted in violation of Idaho Appellate Rules 18,28, and 35. 
Appellate Rule 18 sets forth the information that shall be contained in the notice of cross- 
appeal and Rule 18(h) provides, "A designation as to what portion, if any, of the reporter's 
transcript is requested by the cross-appellant in addition to those requested by the appellant in the 
original notice of appeal, and a certificationthat the estimated reporter's fee for the transcript 
i requested by the cross-appeal has been paid or that payment is exempt." Claudia did not request 
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a transcript of the November 17, 2006 hearing (R., Vol. I, p. 198.) Larry did not request a 
transcript of the November 17, 2006 hearing. (R., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 254.) No transcript of the 
November 17, 2006 hearing is included in the record before this Court. Idaho Appellate Rule 
28(a) provides, "Parties are responsible for designating the documents which will comprise the 
clerk's record on appeal." Transcripts are not automatically included in the standard record 
unless a request for additional reporter's transcript has been made. I.A.R. 28(b). Appellate Rule 
28(c) pennits a party to request additional documents, however, "Any party may request any 
written document filed or lodged with the district co urt..." I.A.R. 28(c)(emphasis added). There 
is no written transcript of the November 17,2006 hearing in the record. 
Second, with the exception of two sentences, the entire excerpt contains argument made 
by Larry's attorney, which is not evidence and is therefore irrelevant. 
Third, and most significantly, the fact that the magistrate court was prepared to rule on 
the issue only establishes that the court was fully prepared prior to the hearing. Larry ignores the 
fact that both parties had submitted numerous affidavits and briefs to the magistrate court prior to 
the hearing.7 The custody issue regarding the "home state" and significant contacts analysis 
under the UCCJEA was fully briefed by both parties. The magistrate court was also provided 
with affidavits from both parties setting forth their respective significant contacts. According to 
the excerpt that is quoted in Larry's brief, Judge Orr stated that she had, "read over all of the 
' On October 27,2006, Larry submitted an Affidavit Re: Significant Connection and Substantial Evidence wherein 
he set forth all of the Idaho connections. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 21-57.) On that same date, Larry also submitted a 
brief titled Memorandum Re: Jurisdiction. (Id.) In response, on November 13,2006, Claudia filed a Responding 
Affidavit Re: Jurisdiction of Claudia Johnson setting forth the connections with New York. (R., Vol. I, pp. 24-38.) 
Claudia also filed a Supplemental Memorandum Re: UCCJEA. (R., Vol. I, pp. 43-50.) Larry then filed a 
Supplemental Affidavit of Larry Johnson on November 17,2006. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 58-76.) 
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memorandums, I've read over the affidavits and I heard brief argument." (RespondentICross- 
Appellant's Brief, p. 35.) Judge On indicated that she had reviewed the briefs and the affidavits 
submitted by the parties, she had heard oral argument from the attorneys, she had spoken with 
the New York judge, and she was prepared to rule on the issue; it is not clear how this constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. 
New York is the "home state" under the UCCJEA and also has the most significant 
contacts under Idaho Code (i 32-1 1-201. Claudia and the children returned to their "home state" 
of New York. The primary purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional competition and is 
designed to prevent the significant contacts analysis and prefers a "home state" analysis in order 
to avoid disputes exactly like these. Nonetheless, even under a significant contacts approach, 
Claudia and the children have more significant contacts in New York than in Idaho. The 
contacts set forth by Larry related to his personal contacts with the state of Idaho, rather than the 
contacts of Claudia and the children. It is simply not possible that Claudia and the children could 
have more contacts with a state in which they had resided for less than three months than New 
York where they had lived for eleven years. The children's only substantive schooling, doctors, 
dentists, fkiends, sports, church, activities and neighbors are in New York. 
C. Claudia Did Not Engage in "Unjustifiable Conduct" and Idaho Code (I 
32-11-208 is Not Applicable to this Case. 
Larry has made every effort to vilify Claudia in this case. As set forth in the record, 
Claudia and the children left Idaho due to Larry's abusive behavior and even at his direction to 
leave and return to New York. (R., Vol. I, p. 174,15.) Claudia is not a kidnapper. Claudia did 
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not return to New York in violation of a custody order or in violation of any order. Claudia did 
not conceal or hide the children's whereabouts. Larry was sewed almost immediately after 
Claudia left with notice of where she and the children were and with notice of the divorce action. 
Claudia had no intention of isolating or hiding the children from Larry when she left and her 
actions show that. 
Larry cites to Idaho Code Section 32-11-208 and alleges that Idaho has jurisdiction 
because Claudia committed "unjustifiable conduct." Interestingly, Larry does not incorporate 
the statute nor provide how this statute applies in this case. This is likely because the statute is 
not applicable. 
Idaho Code 9 32-1 1-208 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 32-1 1-204, Idaho Code, or 
by other law of this state if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this 
chapter because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in 
unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction 
unless: 
(1) The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in 
the exercise of jurisdiction; 
(2) A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under sections 
32-1 1-201 through 32-1 1-203, Idaho Code, determines that this state is a 
more appropriate forum under section 32-1 1-207, Idaho Code; or 
(3) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the 
criteria specified in sections 32-1 1-201 through 32-1 1-203, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code 5 32-1 1-208. Section 32-1 1-208 provides that if Idaho has jurisdiction because the 
person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, then Idaho can 
decline jurisdiction unless no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 32- 
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11-201 through 32-11-203. This statute does not give Idaho jurisdiction because it does not 
apply to the facts in this case. Under subpart (a) Idaho does not have subject matter jurisdiction. 
Under subpart (a)(3) New York has subject matter jurisdiction under either the "home state" 
analysis or significant contacts analysis. 
To the extent that Larry is agreeing that New York is the state that properly has subject 
matter jurisdiction and New York should have declined jurisdiction, this argument also fails 
because this Court does not have the power to review New York the order. Additionally, even if 
the New York court were to apply this provision, it could not decline jurisdiction under subpart 
(a)(3) because there is no other state that would have jurisdiction. 
VI. The Magistrate Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Entering an Order 
Staying the Proceedings. 
On May 2, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Appeal and Motion to Dismiss 
and reversed Judge On's orders. (R., Vol. I, pp. 133-137.) On May 6, 2008, Larry filed a 
Motion for Automatic Disqualification and Judge On entered the Order for Disqualification the 
following day. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 4.) The Honorable Magistrate Judge James A. Schiller was 
assigned to the case.' (Id.) Larry filed a Motion for Temporary Orders on June 20, 2008. (R., 
Supp. Vol. 221-222.) Claudia filed her Notice of Appeal to this Court on July 17, 2008. (R., 
Vol. I, pp. 197-201 .) 
Lany argues that Judge Schiller abused his discretion by "ignoring" the directive of the 
district court. Judge Schiller l l l y  recognized that he was bound by Judge Drescher's decision 
Judge Schiller acknowledged the difficulty of reconsidering another judge's decision and stated, "But how do I 
reconsider it since I didn't make the decision in the fust place." (Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 26, L. 2-3.) 
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and even stated, "However, I recognized that I'm bound by that decision." (Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 
14, L. 12-13.) On July 22, 2008, Judge Schiller entered the order drafted by Lany's attorney 
titled Order Denying Summer Visitation; Order Staying all Proceedings During Appeal; and 
Order Certifying Direct and Expedited Appeal (hereinafter referred to as "Order Staying 
Proceedings"). (R., Vol. I, pp. 202-207.) The Order Staying Proceedings provides at the first 
paragraph, "The Court finds that Judge O n  was correct in her decision on the jurisdictional 
issue." (R., Vol. I, p. 203.) Judge Schiller interlineated, "however this Court is bound by Judge 
Drescher [sic] decision." (Id.) Judge Schiller clearly recognized that he was bound by Judge 
Drescher's decision. The fact that a magistrate court is bound by a district court's decision does 
not prevent the magistrate from staying the proceedings pending an appeal, and in fact, is 
permitted under the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
Judge Schiller did not abuse his discretion by staying the proceedings pending this appeal 
under Idaho Appellate Rule 13. Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b) provides in pertinent part, 
In civil actions, unless prohibited by order of the Supreme 
Court, the district court shall have the power and authority to rule 
upon the following motions and to take the following actions 
during the pendency on an appeal; 
(14) Stay execution or enforcement of any judgment, order or 
decree appealed from, other than a money judgment, upon the 
posting of security and upon such conditions as the district court 
shall determine. 
I.A.R. 13(b)(l4)(emphasis added). Idaho Appellate Rule 13(f)(2) provides, 
Stay Upon Permissive Appeal. 
... 
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(2) Stay after a motion for permission to appeal has been 
granted. 
The granting of a motion for permission to appeal under Rule 12 
by the Supreme Court automatically states the entire action or 
proceeding until the appeal has terminated, and during that time 
the district court or administrative agency shall have no power or 
authority over the action or proceeding, except as provided in 
subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this Rule. Provided, the 
granting of the motion for permission to appeal does not stay the 
enforcement of any judgment, order or decree, but the district court 
or administrative agency, or the Supreme Court, may grant a stay 
in the manner provided in this Rule for a stay during an appeal. 
The Order Staying Proceedings ordered an expedite appeal under Rule 12.1 and stated at 
Paragraph 4: 
Accordingly, this Court recommends and certifies that this is an 
appropriate case for an expedited appeal by the Plaintiff pursuant 
to Rule 44, Idaho Avvellate Rules and it is hereby Certified that 
this is an appropriate case for a direct appeal by the Plaintiff per 
Rule 12(d), Idaho Aovellate Rules, and more specifically Rule 12.1 
because the best interest of the children would be sewed by an 
immediate permissive appeal by the Plaintiff to the Supreme Court 
of Idaho. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 205.) Appellate Rule 12.l(d) provides in pertinent part, "Any appeal by 
permission of judgment or order of a magistrate under this rule shall not be valid and effective 
unless and until the Supreme Court shall enter an order accepting such judgment or order of a 
magistrate, as appealable and granting leave to a party to file a notice of appeal within a time 
certain." I.A.R. 12.l(d). 
Under Idaho law, Judge Schiller may stay the proceedings pending the appeal and that 
decision is discretionary with the court. Larry fails to articulate how Judge Schiller abused his 
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discretion by entering the stay; this is especially curious in light of the fact that he 
acknowledged, via his attorney, that the magistrate court had the ability to stay the proceedings: 
THE COURT: Or I can stay the proceedings pending the appeal. 
MR. BEVIS: Pardon? 
THE COURT: I can stay the proceedings pending the appeal, 
can't I? 
MR. BEVIS: You could- 
THE COURT: I have the ability to do that. 
MR. BEVIS: You do have the right to--but, at this point in time, 
you also have the obligation to go forward with the trial. I don't 
think you can just wait until the Supreme Court of Idaho rules. I 
mean- 
THE COURT: You're saying I don't have the ability to stay and - 
MR. BEVIS: No. You have the abiliiy to stay. 
(Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 15, L. 16-25, p. 16, L. 1-4 (emphasis added).) 
The magistrate court made a reasoned and logical decision to stay the proceedings and 
explained, "I can stay all proceedings pending appeal, because basically the appeal is over 
whether or not I have jurisdiction to begin with. That's the issue to be appealed. If the Supreme 
Court says, Judge O n  was correct and New York should have taken jurisdiction, then my trial 
that I try pending the appeal is a total waste of time, effort and money." (Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 
16, L. 15-21.) 
Judge Schiller further explained: 
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But what I'm concerned about in this case, is, again, if I 
enter an order contrary to the New York order, my order, in my 
opinion is meaningless and a waste of time. And, secondly, I'm 
not willing to enter that order until I've had a hearing to determine 
what's appropriate. I'm not gonna [sic] enter orders concerning 
custody of children without hearing proper evidence and giving it 
due consideration. 
SecondIy, going through all of that and then having the 
Supreme Court say you didn't have jurisdiction in the first place, 
Hopuer doesn't mean that and didn't say that, to me is a 
tremendous waste of time. There has been an appeal of Judge 
Drescher's decision. So I think the appropriate thing for this Court 
to do and this is what I'm going to do, I'm going to stay the 
proceedings in this case, decline to take any further action until 
there is a decision on the appeal as to which court has custody. If, 
much to my surprise, the Idaho Supreme Court does rule that Idaho 
has custody rather than New York, then I think we have a disaster 
on our hands. Again, exactly what the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act was meant to avoid, which is conflicting orders. 
New York has entered orders. If I enter conflicting orders, then 
how do we enforce that? 
So I'm staying these proceedings pending appeal, declining 
that further. 
(Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 39, L. 14-25, p. 40, L. 1-11.) 
Judge Schiller acted within the bounds of his discretion by staying the proceedings. 
Larry has failed to set forth any applicable legal authority or argument in support of his Cross- 
Appeal. 
VII. Claudia's Appeal is Not Frivolous and Larry is Not Entitled to Attorney 
Fees. 
This Appeal is not frivolous. Judge Orr agreed with Claudia that Idaho does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and after consulting with the New York court, 
held that Idaho could make no custody determination. Judge Orr agreed with Claudia that the 
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remaining property issues should be dismissed.under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) 
because there were parallel proceedings pending in New York. Judge Schiller agreed with 
Claudia and Judge Orr that Idaho does not have subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA 
and further, that Hopper is not applicable to this case. Judge Schiller stated, 
And in this case, Judge Drescher, is now taking Houuer a step 
further and applying Hopper to a jurisdictional question. Hopuer 
didn't have anything to do with jurisdiction. Houuer had to do 
with a custody decision. There was only one court exercising 
jurisdiction at that point in time. And - and I don't think that 
Houuer goes that far. I don't think Hoauer overrules the statutes 
on what is proper custody - or proper jurisdiction. I personally 
think that Judge Orr made the proper decision. 
(Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 37, L. 25, p. 38, L. 1-9.) Moreover, Judge Schiller also noted one of the 
huge differences between Hopper and this case: 
The Hopuer dance is just order her to move back here and I think 
I've got a problem with that where he stipulated - there's a huge 
difference between this case and Hopuer in that your client, for 
whatever reason and, obviously, what the motivation was is 
speculation. I know what you're representing what the motivation 
was, but the simple fact is your client stipulated to New York 
having continuing jurisdiction and that's different from Houuer. 
(Tr., Supp. Vol. 11, p. 20, L. 14-21.) 
Claudia cited to substantial legal authority in support of her argument on appeal which is 
consistent with the conclusions made by both Judge Orr and Judge Schiller; this Appeal is not 
frivolous or without foundation. 
VIII. Claudia Should be Awarded Attorney Fees Incurred on Larry's Cross-Appeal. 
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Claudia should be awarded her attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against 
Lany's Cross-Appeal pursuant to Idaho Code F) 12-121, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l), 
and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Attorney fees can be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil 
action that is brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Excel Leasing Co. v. 
Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 712, 796 P.2d 585, 589 (Ct.App. 1989), citing Minich v. Gem State 
Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 91 1,591 P.2d 1078 (1979). 
Similarly, attorney fees may be awarded for frivolous conduct in a civil case pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 12-123. Conduct is frivolous under Section 12-123 if it (1) obviously serves 
merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action; or (2) is not well 
supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. LC. $12-123(b); Merrill v. 
Gibson, 142 Idaho 692, 696, 132 P.3d 449, 453 (2006) "It is the intent of the legislature of the 
state of Idaho that this act grant prevailing litigants in civil actions the right to be made whole for 
attorney's fees and costs when justice so requires." LC. F) 12-121, Legislative Intent. 
Where Plaintiff failed to provide argument or authority in support of the only issues on 
appeal that were properly before the court, the appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably and without foundation and thus, Defendant was entitled to attorney fees and costs 
on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code $12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) and Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41. Anson v. Le Bois Race Track, Inc., 130 Idaho 303, 939 P.2d 1382 (1997). 
Where issues of discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if the appellant fails 
APPELLANTICROSSRESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 31- 
to make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion. Andrews v. Idaho Forest Indus., 
Inc., 117 Idaho 195,786 P.2d 586 (Ct.App. 1990). 
The "frivolous" inquiry is narrow and the court must look at the objective reasonableness 
of the entire pleading and not the subjective intent of the pleader. Kullgren v. Chevy Chase (In 
re Kullgren), 109 B.R. 949, 955 (Banktcy.C.D.Cal.1990). The question is whether the position 
adopted was not only incorrect, but so "plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, 
unreasonable or without foundation." Snipe v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265 
(Ct.App.1997), citing Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 91 1, 684 P.2d 307, 313 
(Ct.App.1984), overruled on other grounds by NBC Leasing Co. v. R & T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 
500,733 P.2d 721 (1987). 
Larry cites to no applicable legal authority in support of his Cross-Appeal. Larry cites to 
only two cases, Hopper and Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995), neither of 
which are applicable to the issue he raised on his Cross-Appeal. The Idaho Appellate Rules 
addressed above specifically provide that the magistrate court may stay proceedings pending the 
appeal. Judge Schiller held, both on the record and in the written order, that he was bound by 
Judge Drescher's decision. Therefore, Judge Schiller did not refuse to follow Judge Drescher's 
order and provided substantial explanation as to why the proceedings would be stayed. 
For the reasons set forth above, Claudia should be awarded her attorney fees and costs 
incurred in responding the Larry's frivolous Cross-Appeal. 
APPELLANTICROSSRESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 32- 
IX. Conclusion. 
The district court committed error when it incorrectly relied on Hopper and reversed the 
magistrate court. The district court made no finding that Idaho had subject matter jurisdiction 
over child custody issues under the UCCJEA nor did it explain how the magistrate erred, other 
than simply citing to Hopper. The district court made no findings or conclusions explaining how 
the magistrate court abused its discretion by dismissing the remaining property issues under Rule 
12(b)(8). The magistrate court's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Claudia respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and afirm the magistrate 
court's dismissal. 
Additionally, Judge Schiller did not abuse his discretion by staying the proceedings 
pending this Appeal. Judge Schiller specifically recognized that he must follow the directive of 
Judge Drescher, but under the Idaho Appellate Rules had the discretion to stay the proceedings. 
Claudia respectfully requests this Court to award her attorney fees incurred in responding 
to Lany's Cross-Appeal. 
DATED this 3'* day of November, 2008. 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
By: 
STANLEY W. WELSH 
Attorneys for DefendantIAppellant 
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